The head of Strategic Air Command, General Tommy Powers, was famous for laughing off the effects of nuclear radiation on genetic mutations with the quip: "Nobody has yet proved to me two heads aren't better than one." General Powers had little time for the civilian nuclear theorists who talked of counter-force strategies, deliberately avoiding Soviet cities and attacking only their missile bases. "Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards," he shouted at Rand's William Kaufmann during one briefing. "At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win." Kaufmann retorted: "Then you had better make sure that they are a man and a woman."
from Martin Walker, The Cold War: A History

According to Lynn Eden's Whole World on Fire, American planners systematically ignored the effects of fire when estimating bomb damage, thereby consigning themselves to producing far more weapons than were necessary.

Nevada Proving Ground - Complete destruction of House No. 1 located 3,500 feet from ground zero, by the March 17, 1953 atom blast at Yucca Flat. The time from the first to last picture was 2 1/3 seconds. The camera was completely enclosed in a 2-inch lead sheath as a protection against radiation. The only source of light was that from the bomb.

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The US strategy, known as SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), had only one response to any attack: full-scale nuclear war. There were no plans for what would happen after tens of millions of people died. "The single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life," according to General George Butler, former head of Strategic Air Command. "We escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion."

According to a 1998 Brookings Institution study, the US spent nearly 8 trillion dollars in the last half of the 20th century on nuclear weapons, about 1/3 of total US military spending on the Cold War. The nuke budget was more than the US spent in the same period on Medicare, education, social services, disaster relief, scientific research (non-nuclear), environmental protection, food safety inspections, highway maintenance, police, prosecutors, judges, and prisons. Combined. The only programs that got more were Social Security and non-nuke defense spending.

Likely attack targets in war (below). I.F. Stone is horrified by pretenses that nuclear war is survivable, 1961.

Word for Word/'The Doomsday Scenario'; Blast From the Past: A Cold War Vision of a Nuclear Nightmare
By SAM ROBERTS
New York Times, March 31, 2002

ATOMIC bombs smuggled into America's cities and set off without warning. The nation under attack from the air. Communications and the economy crippled. Chaos in the streets. One in five Americans dead.

An apocalyptic Hollywood movie plot? Hardly. In 1958, one year after Nevil Shute published his haunting nuclear holocaust classic ''On the Beach,'' government planners drafted their own top-secret doomsday scenario, speculating in clinical detail about the consequences of a full-scale nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.

The Defense Department's Emergency Plans Book, which was declassified by mistake in 1998, has just been published as ''The Doomsday Scenario'' by MBI Publishing (the book was printed in China, of all places). A historian, L. Douglas Keeney, discovered the plans in the National Archives and annotated the unsugarcoated text, which resonates in the contingency strategies drawn up in Washington after Sept. 11 for preserving government operations and mounting nuclear retaliation.

Excerpts from the document and Mr. Keeney's accompanying commentary follow. SAM ROBERTS

The U.S.S.R. is capable of:

a. Producing atomic weapons of varying yields ranging from a few kilotons (thousands of tons) to megatons (millions of tons) of TNT equivalent, biological and chemical agents, and incendiary and high-explosive weapons.

b. Delivering these weapons anywhere within the United States and upon U.S.-deployed forces and Allies by piloted aircraft, submarine-launched missiles or mines or clandestine means. . . .

The planners here assume that the Soviets were at least on par with our own stockpiles, if not ahead. . . . Even in 1958, it was assumed that America would be attacked by biological and chemical weapons. . . . The ability to deliver weapons ''anywhere in the United States'' . . . acknowledges that the Soviets had superb aeronautical design and manufacturing capabilities.

Warning Capabilities:

Weapons launched from submarines may arrive without warning. Likewise, weapons emplaced by clandestine means may be detonated without warning. . . .

In 1958 little could forewarn when the first nuclear weapons would hit America -- these would be missiles launched from Soviet submarines or bombs hidden inside America. . . . The warning one might expect before a submarine-launched ballistic missile impacted was in the range of 13 minutes. An airborne attack might be preceded by 25 minutes' warning. There would be no warning for a weapon preplaced on American soil. As early as 1958, American intelligence agencies had reason to believe that it was possible to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, place it in a desired location and then control its firing. This is information that has never before been released to the public.

The Attack:

The U.S.S.R. has made attacks with large numbers of atomic weapons on the United States and on some of its territories, bases overseas and its allies. The domestic air defense warning yellow for the first attack was disseminated two hours before U.S.S.R. aircraft appeared over U.S. frontiers. At the same time as the air defense warning yellow was announced, submarine-launched missiles arrived and weapons emplaced by clandestine means were detonated. However, the major weight of attack has been delivered by manned aircraft.

Air Defense operations in North America and overseas have destroyed a substantial portion of the attacking aircraft, but half of those destroyed had reached the bomb release line and had released their weapons. U.S. and Allied military operations have resulted in casualties and damage to the enemy at least as great as those received.

Notwithstanding severe losses of military and civilian personnel and material, air operations against the enemy are continuing, and our land and naval forces are heavily engaged. Both sides are making use of atomic weapons for tactical air support and in land battle.

Unfortunately, half of the Soviet planes that they do shoot down have already dropped their bombs. . . . As we counterstrike, we will use nuclear weapons, some of which will explode in our own air space.

Both on the North American continent and overseas, the major weight of the attacks appears to have been directed on U.S. and Allied military installations. . . . In addition, the District of Columbia and many population and industrial centers have been attacked.

Washington D.C., is heavily hit (as would be expected). Civilian populations, however, do not seem to be targeted. Why did the planners presume this? The use of weapons against civilian populations is a tactic designed to break an opponent's will to fight, but it has rarely worked. . . . Thus, the Soviets are furiously trying to destroy our capacity to retaliate. They are wasting no bombs on terror strikes.

The surface bursts have resulted in widespread radioactive fallout of such intensity that over substantial parts of the United States the taking of shelter for considerable periods of time is the only means of survival. . . .

The general level of casualties throughout the United States is extremely serious. In many localities it is catastrophic.

The population of the United States in 1958 was 140 million. Almost one in five will die.

Post-Attack Analysis:

With human casualties exceeding material losses, ultimate recuperative potential to meet the requirements of the surviving population is high, providing this population can be adequately motivated. In spite of the magnitude of the catastrophe that has struck the nation and the possibility of additional but lighter attacks, more than 100 million people and tremendous material resources remain. . . .

The attack has caused an almost complete paralysis in the functioning of the economic system in all of its aspects. . . . During the survival period the economy is operating in a highly disorganized manner.

The utilized labor force is engaged in large numbers in disposing of the dead, taking care of surviving injured, decontaminating and cleaning up bombed areas, returning public works and utilities to operation, and other activities related to the direct and immediate effects of the attacks. . . . There are few workers left to produce goods. . . .

Government control is seriously jeopardized and central federal direction is virtually nonexistent. Many of the highest government officials are casualties although the presidential office is functioning. Washington was so severely damaged that no operations there are possible. . . .

In many areas, including several of the largest cities, where surviving injured outnumber the surviving uninjured active adults, the social fabric has ceased to exist in the pre-attack pattern. . . .

Here we see that even in 1958, the government actually agreed [that] shelters would be inadequate. Many would be destroyed. Most were too far away to be useful; a large number for whom the shelters were intended would die before they reached them. Those who did get in would be so badly contaminated that they would soon succumb to radiation sickness and die.

From a pre-attack total of 1.6 million hospital beds, approximately 100,000 are available for use. . . .

The medical care requirements are overwhelming. In addition to 25 million dead or dying, there are 25 million surviving casualties who require emergency medical care. . . . Of the 25 million radiation casualties, 12.5 million have received lethal dosages and have died or will die regardless of treatment. . . .

Inadequate provision for laboratory diagnostic aids has hampered the more accurate determination of degrees of radiation injury. Unless such determinations are made, many lives may be lost because treatment is being given to hopeless cases. . . . The housing situation is critical. . . . In only very isolated situations is the housing inventory adequate to rehouse survivors from attacked areas.

Does the author contradict an earlier assumption and now say that civilian populations were targeted? Probably not. But collateral damage in nuclear war would be unavoidable and extensive.

Blast damage has not only completely eliminated major water and sewer networks, but has at the same time dangerously impaired the function of water and sewer facilities in peripheral areas otherwise unaffected by blast and fire damage. . . .

The monetary and credit systems have collapsed in damaged areas and are under severe pressure in those areas overrun with refugees. . . . Bartering, unorganized confiscation and looting are in evidence. . . .

Severe disruption to transportation service exists in all attacked and contaminated areas. . . .

Yes, production will be curtailed or blocked due to damage, manpower losses and radiation. But the ''X'' factor is the will of American to get back on its feet. . . . Therein lies the great strength of America: the refusal to backslide into the abyss.