Introduction
Along with allegations of illegal domestic spying, the Central Intelligence Agency was also said to have been involved in attempts to assassinate a number of foreign leaders whose policies were disliked by various Washington administrations from Dwight Eisenhower to Richard Nixon. These and other allegations were investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with Senator Frank Church of Idaho as chairman. The report of the committee, published on November 20, 1975, was released over the strong objections of the Gerald Ford Administration. Portions of the introduction and a summary of the report are reprinted here.
Source:
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report of
the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence
Activities, Washington, 1975.
This interim report covers allegations of United States involvement in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. The report also examines certain other instances in which foreign political leaders in fact were killed and the United States was in some manner involved in activity leading up to the killing, but in which it would be incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been to encourage assassination.
The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in several assassination plots. The Committee believes that, short of war, assassination is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality. It should be rejected as a tool of foreign policy.
Our inquiry also reveals serious problems with respect to United States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of these problems are addressed here on the basis of our investigation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into covert action has been completed.…
Summary of Findings and Conclusions
The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:
Assassination plots.—Did United States officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assassinate foreign leaders?
Involvement in other killings.—Did United States officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders?
Authorization.—Where there was involvement by United States officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities authorized and if so, at what levels of our Government?
Communication and control.—Even if not authorized in fact, were the
assassination activities perceived by those involved to be within the scope
of their lawful authority? If they were so perceived, was there inadequate
control exercised by higher authorities over the agencies to prevent such misinterpretation?
The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries:
Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire).—In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.
Fidel Castro (Cuba).—United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were provided encouragement and material support by the United States.
Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic).—Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. From early in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the United States Government generally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were aware that the dissidents intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.
Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam).—Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and was carried out without United States involvement or support.
General Rene Schneider (Chile).—On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. There is no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction.
Assassination capability (Executive action).—In addition to these five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized assassination capability. During these discussions, the concept of assassination was not affirmatively disavowed.
Similarities and differences among the plots.—The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences among the plots:
(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot, or were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.
(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.
The Castro and Lumumba cases are examples of plots conceived by United States officials to kill foreign leaders.
In the Trujillo case, although the United States Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, this country was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the weapons actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents.
The Schneider case differs from the Castro and Trujillo cases. The United
States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dissidents considered General
Schneider an obstacle to their plans, sought a coup and provided support to
the dissidents. However, even though the support included weapons, it appears
that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was
to abduct General Schneider, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case,
some United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup to accomplish
his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those officials sought the
death of Diem himself.
Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control.
To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two points must
be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United States Government opposed
the various leaders in question. Officials at the highest levels objected to
the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power
in Chile would be harmful to American interests, and thought of Lumumba as
a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations
has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities against the
regimes in question. For example, the plots against Fidel Castro personally
cannot be understood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive
assaults upon his regime, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation
Mongoose in 1962.
Once methods of coercion and violence are chosen, the probability of loss of life is always present. There is, however, a significant difference between a cold-blooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of intervening in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, the Committee has endeavored to explore as fully as possible the questions of how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, at what level.
The picture that emerges from the evidence is not a clear one. This may be due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which, even after our long investigation, remains conflicting and inconclusive. Or it may be that there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization so that an activity such as assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without express authority.
The Committee finds that the system of executive command and control was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels assassination activity was known and authorized. This situation creates the disturbing prospect that Government officials might have undertaken the assassination plots without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presidents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful “plausible denial” in which Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. Whether or not the respective Presidents knew of or authorized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must bear the ultimate responsibility for the activities of his subordinates.
The Committee makes four other major findings. The first relates to the Committee's inability to make a finding that the assassination plots were authorized by the Presidents or other persons above the governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have perceived that, according to their judgment and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to disclose their plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for not ruling out assassination, particularly after certain Administration officials had become aware of prior assassination plans and the establishment of a general assassination capability.
There is admittedly a tension among the findings. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it may be more important that there appeared to have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished from those who were not. Words of urgency which may have meant killing to the former, may have meant nothing of the sort to the latter.