In high diplomacy as well as in their massacres, the closing years of the U.S. War of Independence seemed to repeat the events of 1763. When Britain acknowledged the independence of the United States of America in another Treaty of Paris in 1783, the crown's negotiators ignored the network of Indian alliances built up in the previous two decades. The treaty made no mention whatever of Native Americans and simply transferred to the new nation ownership of all territory south of the Great Lakes, east of the Mississippi, and north of the Floridas, which, in related negotiations, were returned to Spain. As France's Native American allies had done earlier, Britain's Indian friends now also reacted with disbelief at their betrayal. From the Cherokee country southward, the British abandonment was virtually complete, and only slightly tempered by the reintroduction of a counterbalance to U.S. power in Spanish Florida.[63] As the Creek leader Alexander McGillivray understated, "to find ourselves and

country betrayed to our enemies and divided between the Spaniards and Americans is cruel and ungenerous."[64]

Farther northward, however, the Treaty of Paris had far less impact. On the Appalachian frontiers and in the Ohio Country, raids and counterraids continued without reference to European diplomacy. In violation of the Paris treaty (and partly in retaliation for the failure of the United States to fulfill its financial obligations under that pact), British forces continued to occupy Detroit and other Great Lakes posts, thus providing supply bases for Native forces throughout the region. Moreover, British North American officials from Quebec's governor Frederick Haldimand down through the ranks of agents stationed in Indian country shared their Native allies' sense of betrayal by the crown's diplomats, and they worked as actively as they could—short of open war with the United States—to support them. In 1784 the governor granted a substantial tract of land on the Grand River in present-day Ontario to the Six Nations Iroquois who had fought the revolutionaries and spent much of the war as refugees at Niagara; ultimately roughly half of the Iroquois population relocated there. From that base, Joseph Brant worked with Native leaders from throughout the Ohio Country and *pays d'en haut* to create a Western Confederacy to coordinate the struggle against the United States and insist that the Ohio River become the border between Indian country and the new republic.[65]

In dealing with the Western Confederacy, the triumphant revolutionaries of the United States were determined, just as Amherst had been in 1763, to discard the niceties of diplomacy and to impose their will on Indians who had no place in their emergent republic. As John Dickinson, president of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, put it, Indians should simply be notified "that peace has been made with Great Britain . . . that the back country with all the forts is thereby ceded to us; that they must now depend upon us for their preservation and, that unless they immediately cease from their outrages . . . we will instantly turn upon them our armies that have conquered the king of Great Britain . . . and extirpate them from the land where they were born and now live." Under this "conquest theory," if Indians were to be allowed to retain any lands east of the Mississippi, they would do so only through the benevolence of the conquerors. In a series of treaties extracted at Fort Stanwix in 1784, Fort McIntosh on the Ohio in 1785, and Fort Finney at the mouth of the Great Miami River in 1786, U.S. commissioners grabbed nearly all of present-day western New York and Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, where surveyors envisioned neat rows of townships in the newly created Northwest Territory. If the crown's protection of Indian land had been a major grievance before the Revolution, the victims now redressed that grievance with a vengeance.[66]

"We have full power to maintain our title by force of arms," Dickinson had crowed on the eve of the first of the postwar treaties.[67] The Western Confederacy proved otherwise when it utterly routed invading U.S. armies led by Josiah Harmar in 1790 and Arthur St. Clair in 1791; of St. Clair's 1,400 troops, 630 were killed or unaccounted for and nearly 300 more injured, proportionally one of the worst defeats federal troops would ever endure against any foe. Through the period of these Indian triumphs, the British government of Quebec remained officially neutral, but arms and other trade goods flowed from Detroit and other posts, and British agents who participated in the Confederacy's councils gave every impression that troops would support the Indians in a crisis. In August 1794 the western war reached its climax as Anthony Wayne's "Legion of the United States," retracing routes attempted by Harmar and St. Clair, marched methodically toward the Confederacy's population centers on the Maumee River. At the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Indian forces that initially failed to turn back Wayne's army sought refuge at a British post on the Maumee. Its commander, fearing he could not resist an assault by Wayne, closed the gates against his Native allies. Left stranded, the Western Confederacy's forces abandoned the field and turned Wayne's relatively minor victory into a major triumph. Over the winter, as word arrived of Jay's Treaty—the 1794 accord that required British withdrawal from the western posts—the various nations and factions of the Confederacy had to make the best deal with the United States that they could. In the summer of 1795 at the Treaty of Greenville, Indian leaders gave up their demand for an Ohio River boundary between Indian country and the United States and yielded most of the present state of Ohio to the victors.[68]

Still, the Greenville Treaty became possible because the new republic, as the old empire had done after 1763, had rediscovered the superiority of

diplomacy, treaties, and ceremonial protocol to brute force. In the months after Fallen Timbers, Wayne relied far less on military intimidation by troops spread thinly in a chain of forts from modern Cincinnati to Fort Wayne than he did on tireless political skills in bringing various leaders and factions to peace. In ceremony and numbers of participants, the Treaty of Greenville resembled nothing seen on the continent since the days of the Seven Years' War. Thereafter, resurrecting an old vocabulary, the presidency of the United States settled into the ceremonial role of "Great Father" to the Indian "Children" with whom the government made treaties.[69]

Yet, for all the efforts made to restore the old diplomatic forms, the new Father had even less ability to mediate successfully between his Indian Children and the White population than had his British predecessor. As a result, the 1795 Greenville Treaty line had no more hope of holding than had the 1768 Line of Property. At best, the federal government settled for an effort to regulate and mitigate, rather than restrict or prohibit, the White expropriation of Indian country that had always been a goal of many rank-and-file revolutionaries. The basic federal strategy was crafted by President Washington's secretary of war, Henry Knox. His "civilization" program—elaborated after 1800 by the Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe administrations—sought to teach Indian peoples to abandon their traditional gendered economy of male hunting, female agriculture, and communal landholding in favor of male plow agriculture and animal husbandry, female domesticity, and, especially, private property. This shift toward a Euro-American way of life, the theory went, would allow Indians to prosper on a much smaller land base, opening up the vast remainder to White yeoman farmers. Of course it also envisioned the end of Indian culture and Indian political autonomy.[70]

In their ceremonial speeches to Native leaders, federal officials wrapped the civilization program in humanitarian rhetoric and promises of concrete aid in the form of plows and tools. But in practice they engaged in relentless efforts to relieve Indians of the "excess" land that made their extravagant hunting lifestyle possible. "To promote this disposition to exchange lands" President Jefferson went so far as to suggest to Indiana territorial governor William Henry Harrison in 1803 that he would "be glad to see the good and influential individuals among them run into

debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individual can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands."[71] Following the president's advice and pledging his "humble exertions to place upon a better footing the affairs of the wretched Indians," Harrison staged a series of treaties with Indians supposedly representing the Delawares, Miamis, Shawnees, Potawatomis, and other nations. By 1809 he had gained paper title to what is now southern Indiana, most of Illinois, and parts of Wisconsin and Missouri for an average price of less than two cents per acre.[72]

South of the Ohio River, the story was much the same. In the first decade of the new century, federal agent Benjamin Hawkins relentlessly pushed the civilization program among the Cherokees and especially the Creeks with whom he lived. Here, too, debt provided a powerful incentive for some leaders to sign a series of land-cession treaties; Creeks alone owed traders some $113,000 in 1803. But in the south matters were vastly complicated by the same kinds of overlapping Euro-American jurisdictional and real-estate claims that had earlier created such chaos in the Ohio Country during the period leading up to Dunmore's War. In 1805 the U.S. Senate refused to ratify a land-cession treaty Hawkins had brokered with the Creeks because the price paid (which would have gone to trader-creditors, not to Indians) was too high. This was only a minor complication when set against the fact that three treaties the state of Georgia had extracted under the conquest theory from purported Creek leaders in the 1780s had never been recognized as valid by either the federal government or the Creek National Council, but had nonetheless been the basis for a number of substantial land grants to Whites.[73] Additional confusion resulted from what was known as the Yazoo Land Fraud. Perpetrated by bribed Georgia legislators in 1795, this complicated affair, involving illegitimate grants of some 35 million acres of Choctaw and Chickasaw land in present-day Mississippi and Alabama, would tie up the U.S. Congress and courts for the better part of twenty years. Meanwhile, quite apart from the competing internal claims of private, state, and federal interests in the United States, the entire Gulf Coast remained an international zone of contention. East and West Florida had in theory been reunited as a single Spanish colony in 1783, but British traders continued to dominate the region's Indian trade from posts in Pensacola and else-

where. Meanwhile, from Pensacola to Mobile, much of western Florida was claimed by the United States as being within the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Sometimes with Spanish permission but more often without it, "Americans" moved into the area in droves, spilling over into Creek territory in what is today Alabama.[74]

On multiple fronts, the contested territories of the southeastern interior were the targets of aggressive White squatters looking for the slightest excuse to expel Native inhabitants. In 1808 the major general of the west Tennessee militia, whose name was Andrew Jackson, summarized their position when he received what later turned out to be a false report that a party of Creeks had killed some Whites settled on contested ground. Dashing off a letter to President Jefferson, he evoked the same specter of an unholy alliance between British imperial officials and Indians that had surfaced so frequently in previous decades. "These horrid scenes bring fresh to our recollection, the influence, during the revolutionary war, that raised the scalping knife and tomahawk, against our defenseless women and children," Jackson wrote. "The blood of our innocent citizens must not flow with impunity—justice forbids it, and the present relative situation of our country with foreign nations require[s] speedy redress, and a final check to these hostile murdering Creeks."[75]

In the face of such U.S. aggression and of myriad controversial land-cession treaties, a new wave of nativist religious prophecies spread throughout the trans-Appalachian west, preached in the north by the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa and his brother Tecumseh and in the south most notably by the Creek prophet Hillis Hadjo (Josiah Francis). Tecumseh personally linked the two movements, both through kinship (his mother was Creek) and through his travels with Hillis Hadjo in the Creek and Cherokee country from 1809 through 1811. Tenskwatawa's message—revealed to him in a trance by the Master of Life—was much the same as that of Neolin half a century earlier: "Spirituous liquor was not to be tasted by any Indians on any account whatever," reported a White American who claimed to know the prophet's message well; "no Indian was to take more than one wife"; "all medicine bags, and all kinds of medicine dances and songs were to exist no more"; "no Indian was to eat any victuals that was cooked by a White person, or to eat any provisions raised by White people, as bread, beef, pork, fowls, etc." Hillis

Tenskwatawa, "the Shawnee Prophet," late in his life.

From George Catlin, *The Open Door, Known as the Prophet, Brother of Tecumseh* (1830). Smithsonian American Art Museum.

Hadjo called for a less thoroughgoing purge of imported goods and foodstuffs, but his Creek followers shunned glass beads and agricultural tools, refused to eat salted meat—a European innovation—and ritually destroyed hogs and cattle. In their revitalized ceremonial dances, they carried wands painted in the traditional southeastern color denoting war, and so came to be known as Red Sticks. And, just as Pontiac a half-century earlier had dreamed of the return of the French Father, the Red Sticks

spread rumors of an imminent restoration of British power in Florida and the revival of the old alliance. Perhaps enough time had passed since the British betrayal of 1783—and enough desperation had accumulated among nativists—to lead some to believe it might actually happen.[76]

Whatever may have been their attitudes toward the British, nativists among both Creeks and Shawnees had no doubts about who their real enemies were. Tenskwatawa insisted that Indians "were not to know the Americans on any account, but to keep them at a distance." Red Sticks called for the obliteration of "everything received from the Americans, [and] all the Chiefs and their adherents . . . friendly to the customs and ways of the White people."[77] As had been the case in the era of Neolin and Pontiac, then, hatred of the racial other translated into particular rage against any of their own people naive enough to think that Whites could be trusted. Contemptuous of accommodationist chiefs who signed land-cession treaties and cooperated with the civilization program, Tenskwatawa gathered his followers in new towns on symbolic spots—first at Greenville and then at the junction of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers—in open defiance of the accommodationist Miami leader Little Turtle, who threatened to have him killed if he did so. Hillis Hadjo and his followers similarly renewed old rivalries; most of the Red Sticks apparently were non-Muskogee speakers, in contrast to the chiefs, many of them *métis,* who had cooperated with Hawkins, had signed land-cession treaties, and, in many respects, were the primary focus of their cleansing wrath. Both Tenskwatawa and Hillis Hadjo waged witch-hunts against their Indian opponents.[78]

Such internal battles between nativists and accommodationists gave Harrison and Jackson the openings they were looking for. In September 1811, while Tecumseh was traveling with Hillis Hadjo in the Creek country, Harrison staged a preemptive march toward Tenskwatawa's town, which President James Madison described as a den of "menacing preparations . . . under the influence and direction of a fanatic of the Shawanese tribe." After a standoff of nearly two months, Tenskwatawa's mixed forces of Shawnees, Kickapoos, Winnebagos, Potawatamis, and others (including some Creeks who had recently moved north to join the prophet) attacked Harrison's camp. Thus began the vastly overrated Battle of Tippecanoe, in which Harrison earned his nickname by holding the field while losing roughly three times as many men as his Indian assailants. Several days later the U.S. troops sealed their victory by burning the prophet's already abandoned town, which, however, was soon reoccupied.[79]

When Tecumseh—who until that time had seemed more concerned with his accommodationist Indian enemies than with his expansionist White ones—returned from his southern journey, he began actively seeking British military aid. News of this development allowed President Madison, in his message to Congress seeking a declaration of war against Great Britain in June 1812, to echo the words his fellow Virginian Jefferson had inserted in the Declaration of 1776: "In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers—a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity."[80]

Notwithstanding such overheated rhetoric, in the north the relationship between Indians and British during the War of 1812 was never more than a marriage of convenience. After Tippecanoe, Tecumseh won some brilliant triumphs against Harrison's forces on the battlefield, sometimes despite rather than because of British aid. A pointless British and Indian siege of Fort Miegs on the Maumee River, for instance, turned into a victory for Tecumseh's forces in April 1813 only because 800 Kentucky militiamen who had surprised a besieging cannon emplacement foolishly pursued the small outparty that manned it toward the main British and Indian encampment. Even then, Fort Miegs remained in U.S. hands, and subsequent futile British-led attempts to assault it led many of Tecumseh's Indian followers to abandon what they saw as a lost cause. Defections continued, particularly after Oliver Hazard Perry's naval victory over the British fleet forced a complete British withdrawal from the Lake Erie region. Harrison's forces pursued the British and Tecumseh's remaining Indian forces up the Thames River of present-day Ontario. In early October the British and Indians made their last stand. After a few shots the Redcoats turned and ran. Between 700 and 800 Indians stood their ground against well over 3,000 of Harrison's men until Tecumseh

fell dead of a gunshot wound to the chest. The fate of his body is uncertain, but it is likely that—like Metacom's long before—it was mutilated by the victors.[81]

As the Battle of the Thames sealed the defeat of Indian resistance in the north, conflict in the south was only beginning to reach its climax. The declaration of war by the United States allowed the British agents in Florida to recruit Indian and African-American allies openly; the Red Sticks, with their constituencies among Creeks and Seminoles, eagerly embraced the offers. In July 1813 a party of Red Sticks returning from Pensacola had traveled ninety miles toward home with arms and supplies when they were attacked at Burnt Corn Creek by Alabama militiamen. The Red Sticks won that minor skirmish, and sent Whites, *métis*, and accommodationist Creeks throughout the region into a panic. More than five hundred people—half militia, half civilians, many of them Muskogee Creeks and *métis*—gathered in a hastily fortified compound at the home of Samuel Mims on the Alabama River. Apparently, however, they did not take their fear of attack seriously enough. On one August day when the compound's gates were propped open with sandbags and many of the defenders were drunk, several hundred Red Sticks swooped down to kill at least half of those inside.[82]

This "Fort Mims Massacre" freed Whites to declare open season on the Red Sticks. From Georgia and the Mississippi Valley, various militias, accompanied by Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creek accommodationists, descended into Creek country and on the Seminole towns of Florida. Most notably Jackson led some two thousand Tennessee and Kentucky militia and Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw forces on a scorched-earth campaign down the Coosa River. In a March 1814 assault on a fortified town at Horseshoe Bend, his combined forces slaughtered nearly eight hundred Red Stick men, women, and children. The man already known as "Old Hickory" for his steadfast leadership of Tennessee militiamen in defiance of professional federal soldiers subsequently marched his troops deliberately through the "Hickory Ground"—sacred Creek territory—to establish a post he called Fort Jackson. There, in August 1814, he imposed a peace treaty that forced the Creeks to yield 22 million acres to the United States. With one exception, the signers were not Red Sticks but accommodationist Creeks who had in fact fought alongside the U.S. militiamen.[83]

The legacy of 1763 hung heavily over these events and others during the War of 1812. The treaty of Fort Jackson demonstrates that for Old Hickory, as for the Paxton Boys before him, there was no real distinction between friendly and hostile Indians. Indeed, the entire Creek campaign stood firmly within a freelance frontier militia tradition that traced back through Gnadenhütten to Conestoga. Although Jackson held a legitimate commission as an officer of the Tennessee militia, he had no authority to negotiate a treaty. In taking charge of the proceedings at Fort Jackson, he took it upon himself to replace the U.S. commissioners originally appointed for the job, because he deemed their instructions too mild. Similar disregard for higher authority characterized Jackson's actions during the next several years. The Treaty of Ghent, which at the end of 1814 brought the conflict between the United States and Britain to an end, supposedly guaranteed to Britain's Indian allies the lands they had held before the war.[84] Emboldened by his famous victory over the British at New Orleans in January 1815, however, Jackson ignored both the treaty and the halfhearted instructions of the Madison administration to continue his conquest of Indian country. In 1818, during what became known as the First Seminole War, Old Hickory won the admiration of a huge sector of the U.S. population for his illegal invasion of Spanish territory, his even more illegal trial of two British subjects for the high crime of assisting the Indian enemies of the United States, and his still more illegal execution of both. Lost in all the hoopla over how Jackson gloriously "made law" rather than "quoted it" was the fact that at the same captured Florida fort where the two Britons at least were given the formality of a trial, Jackson had Hillis Hadjo and another Red Stick leader, Homathle Mico, summarily executed and dragged off to unmarked graves.[85]

By 1820, after the Adams-Onís Treaty between the United States and Spain had conveyed ownership of Florida to the republic, Jackson and his subordinates had imposed additional treaties on the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. These documents transferred millions of acres in an arc stretching from Georgia through Alabama and Mississippi through western Tennessee—the "black belt" that would become the

Self-portrait of Hillis Hadjo, prophet of the Red Stick movement.
Watercolor, London, 1817. British Museum.

Cotton Kingdom—to White American hands. Jackson's attitude toward the proceedings echoed that of Amherst in 1763. "I have long viewed treaties with the Indians [as] an absurdity not to be reconciled to the principles of our government," he explained to President James Monroe in 1817. If "Indians are the subjects of the United States, inhabiting its territory and acknowledging its sovereignty, then is it not absurd for the sovereign to negotiate by treaty with the subject?" Therefore, "whenever the safety,

interest, or defense of the country should render it necessary for the government of the United States to occupy and possess any part of the territory, used by them for hunting," Congress had "the right to take it and dispose of it."[86]